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The first major outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever
(MHF) outside a laboratory environment occurred in the
subdistrict of Watsa, Democratic Republic of Congo, from
October 1998 to August 2000. We performed a serosurvey
of household contacts of MHF patients to identify undetect-
ed cases, ascertain the frequency of asymptomatic Marburg
infection, and estimate secondary attack risk and postinter-
vention reproduction number. Contacts were interviewed
about their exposure and symptoms consistent with MHF.
Blood samples were tested for anti–Marburg immunoglobu-
lin G (IgG). One hundred twenty-one (51%) of 237 identified
contacts participated; 72 (60%) were not known to the
health authorities. Two participating contacts were seropos-
itive and reported becoming ill after the contact; no serolog-
ic evidence for asymptomatic or mild Marburg infection was
found. The secondary attack risk was 21%; the postinter-
vention reproduction number was 0.9, consistent with an
outbreak sustained by repeated primary transmission,
rather than large-scale secondary transmission.
M
arburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) is a rare disease
caused by the Marburg filovirus; it occurs in central,
east, and southern Africa. MHF is characterized by sudden
onset of fever, headache, myalgia, arthralgia, and frequent-
ly progresses to diarrhea and vomiting, hemorrhagic
diathesis (petechiae, hematemesis, melena), and death (1).
Case fatality reached 88% in a community outbreak in
Uige, Angola (2). No vaccine or antiviral therapy is avail-
able; supportive treatment consists primarily of correcting
fluid and electrolyte imbalances. The putative diagnosis is
established on clinical and epidemiologic grounds and
confirmed by polymerase chain reaction (PCR), antigen-
capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA),
immunoglobulin M (IgM) ELISA, or virus isolation.
The reservoir animal species capable of surviving
Marburg infection and sustaining the virus’s lifecycle has
not been discovered (3); thus, transmission patterns from
the reservoir to humans are not known. Transmission
between humans occurs through direct contact with symp-
tomatic MHF patients or with their body fluids or remains
(4). The risk for transmission of Marburg virus is assumed
to increase with the intensity of physical contact and the
amount of body fluids shed, as shown for Ebola virus (5).
The first major community outbreak of MHF described
(>150 putative cases, case fatality 83%) was in the mining
village of Durba and the neighboring town, Watsa, in the
northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in
1999. The outbreak probably started in October 1998, had
several peaks alternating with latent periods, and ended in
August 2000, when the last confirmed MHF cases
occurred (6). Primary cases were predominantly in
orpailleurs (unofficial gold miners), while secondary cases
were predominantly in household contacts and healthcare
workers. Response activities similar to those for Ebola out-
breaks were started in May 1999 with temporary assistance
from expert teams. These measures included active and
passive surveillance, follow-up of contacts, isolation of
cases, barrier nursing, and safe burials (7).
The surveillance system likely did not identify all MHF
cases because surveillance officers did not make sufficient
efforts to approach families of primary case-patients,
patients with mild cases were not referred to an experi-
enced clinician for assessment (8), or contacts concealed
symptoms compatible with MHF to avoid isolation. We
carried out a serosurvey of household contacts to ascertain
unidentified MHF cases and to estimate the secondary
attack risk and postintervention reproduction number.
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Study Area and Population
The epicenter of the 1998–2000 MHF outbreak, Durba,
is 14 km from Watsa town, the administrative center of the
subdistrict of Watsa. Watsa Subdistrict is located near the
border with Uganda and Sudan. Watsa’s health system was
seriously compromised during the outbreak by economic
decline and the ongoing war in eastern DRC.
Our survey was of lay persons, referred to as household
contacts, whose contact with an MHF patient occurred
during lay activities, such as nursing a patient (supporting,
feeding, washing, and the like, whether at home or in
health facilities), transporting a patient or body, or prepar-
ing a body for burial. Healthcare workers whose contact
occurred during their professional duties were not eligible. 
Cases of MHF were either laboratory confirmed (posi-
tive by PCR, antigen-capture ELISA, virus isolation, or a
combination of IgG ELISA, IgG indirect immunofluores-
cence assay [IFA], and clinical and epidemiologic evi-
dence [48 cases]) or epidemiologically linked (persons for
whom laboratory confirmation was not attempted who had
acute fever, hemorrhage, and contact with a laboratory-
confirmed patient [25 cases]). Forty-five cases were
known from surveillance during the outbreak; we identi-
fied 28 retrospectively. Contacts of suspected case-patients
whose conditions were not laboratory confirmed or epi-
demiologically linked as defined above were not eligible
because their diagnosis lacked certainty.
We attempted to visit the households of all 73 MHF
patients and to prepare a list of persons who had direct
contact with the patient or his or her body fluids or
remains. If contacts were temporarily absent, we under-
took at least 2 repeat visits. If they had moved away, we
tried to locate them at their new address, unless distance or
lack of security (e.g., rebel activity, bandits) hindered us,
in which case we interviewed former neighbors about the
contacts’disease episodes in the 4 weeks after the patient’s
illness. We asked all contacts we met to give verbal
informed consent; if they agreed, we interviewed them and
took blood samples. This study was approved by the ethics
committee of the Antwerp Institute for Tropical Medicine
and the representative of the Ministry of Health in Watsa.
Interviews
After establishing the identity of the contact and the
relationship to the patient, we asked an open-ended ques-
tion about the role the contact played during the patient’s
illness. We also asked closed-ended questions on whether
the contact had touched, carried, or embraced the patient
(and whether the patient at that point had diarrhea, vomit-
ing, or bleeding) and whether the contact had touched the
patient’s clothes or linen (and whether these were soiled
with stool, vomitus, or blood). Since patients who died
often had had diarrhea, vomiting, and bleeding in the final
stages of disease, we also asked whether the contact had
touched, carried, embraced, or washed the person after
death. While field testing the questionnaire, we found that
protective gear such as gloves was unavailable to lay per-
sons; thus, all contacts were assumed to be unprotected. We
asked about symptoms the contact had experienced during
the 4 weeks after exposure; these symptoms (Table 1) cor-
respond to the ones used during the epidemic to define a
clinically suspected case.
Blood Sampling and Testing
After the interview, 5–10 mL venous blood was taken
from contacts. After 12 to 24 hours, serum was separated
from the blood clot, refrigerated at ≈4°C, and transported
to the Uganda Virus Research Institute (within 1 to 2
weeks). There it was frozen at –70°C and shipped on dry
ice to the National Institute for Communicable Diseases,
Johannesburg. Serum was examined by ELISA and IFA
and considered positive if anti-Marburg IgG was found in
both tests.
Data Analysis
Data were entered with EpiInfo version 6.0 (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA), and
analyzed with Stata version 8.2 software (StataCorp LP,
College Station, TX, USA). Depending on symptoms asso-
ciated with increased virus shedding and on the intensity of
the contact, level of exposure was categorized. Low-level
contact included any direct contact with a living case-
patient without diarrhea, vomiting, or bleeding; or touching
clothes or sheets not soiled with stool, vomitus, or blood.
Medium-level contact was defined as touching a living
case-patient with diarrhea, vomiting, or bleeding; touching
clothes or sheets soiled with stool, vomitus, or blood; or
touching remains. High-level contact included carrying or
embracing a living patient who had diarrhea, vomiting, or
bleeding; or carrying, embracing, or cleaning remains.
We established transmission chains and generations for
all patients, taking into account work as a gold digger,
exposure to other patients, incubation period, and date of
onset (M. Borchert, unpub. data). When a patient had been
working as a gold digger and had been exposed to another
patient, we gave priority to the confirmed human-to-
human exposure over the possible primary exposure and
classified these cases as nonprimary ones.
We calculated the secondary attack risk as the propor-
tion of household contacts of primary case-patients who
then became secondary case-patients themselves, includ-
ing only primary case-patients whose contact list could be
established fully and who did not share contacts with
another case-patient; we used the analogous approach to
RESEARCH
434 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 3, March 2006estimate the tertiary attack risk. We computed the repro-
duction number (Rp) as the product of the secondary attack
risk and the average number of contacts per primary case-
patient. As most cases in our survey had occurred after
control measures were implemented, we consider this
number to be the postintervention Rp, not the basic repro-
duction number R0.
Results
Completeness of Data
Household contacts of 73 MHF patients were eligible to
participate in the survey. We completed contact lists for 48
patients (66%). For 7 patients, Watsa health authorities had
listed some contacts during the epidemic. Because we
could not meet these patients, their contacts, or others who
could verify the list’s completeness we likely missed some
contacts. For 18 patients, no contacts had been listed by the
health authorities. Since we did not speak to anyone who
had witnessed the case during the epidemic, contacts have
also probably been missed for these cases.
Existing surveillance records listed 141 contacts. For
the 48 cases we could investigate fully, 96 additional con-
tacts were found. Seventy-one of these were contacts of
patients identified by surveillance during the outbreak. The
total number of identified contacts therefore was 237 (141
+ 96), relating to 55 (48 + 7) of 73 cases.
A patient whose case was fully investigated had, on
average, 4.46 contacts; on this basis, one would expect 326
contacts for all 73 patients. The 237 identified contacts
correspond to 73% of this expected number. A total of 143
contacts could be traced, and 124 consented to being inter-
viewed and giving a blood sample, representing 52% of
the 237 identified contacts and 38% of the 326 expected
contacts. Three persons listed by surveillance denied any
physical contact with the patient and were excluded from
analysis. Therefore, results refer to 121 study participants.
Characteristics of Contacts
The median interval between the onset of the patient’s
disease and the contact’s interview and blood sample col-
lection was 24 months (range 11–48). Half of the contacts
were female, and three fourths were 15–49 years of age.
Most contacts were family members (88%), while col-
leagues accounted for 11% (Table 2). 
Half of the contacts held or carried a patient, a third fed
or washed a patient, and a tenth reported sharing a bed with
a patient (Table 3). Exposure to a living patient was almost
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fluids and excreta. Forty-three percent of contacts had
exposure to remains. The exposure level was low in 13%,
medium in 19%, and high in 68% of contacts and did not
differ between the sexes.
For 43 of the 50 contacts known to surveillance, we
compared exposure reported in our survey with exposure
documented by surveillance officers during the outbreak.
For 88% of contacts, surveillance and study information
agreed.
Two study participants were positive for anti–Marburg
IgG: a 21-year-old brother and a 27-year-old male neigh-
bor of MHF patients. Both contacts were highly exposed to
their respective primary case-patients. These contacts were
also, as unofficial gold miners, at risk for primary trans-
mission themselves (6). The 21-year-old reported 6 gener-
al symptoms within 4 weeks after exposure, including
fatigue, abdominal pain, nausea/vomiting, hiccoughs,
chest pain, and difficulty breathing, but he did not fulfill
the definition of a suspected case because he did not exhib-
it fever or bleeding. The 27-year-old reported a hemor-
rhagic fever syndrome, including vomiting and coughing
blood and bloody or black stool. Neither contact sought
medical care. We consider them to be additional confirmed
patients and classified them as secondary cases because of
the combination of high exposure and postexposure symp-
toms compatible with MHF. The 119 seronegative contacts
were considered nonpatients. Thus, the overall seropreva-
lence in our study population is 1.65% (95% confidence
interval [CI] 0.2%–5.8%), the same as in the general pop-
ulation (1.64%) (6). 
Although almost all contacts were seronegative, one
third reported fever within 4 weeks of contact with a
patient (Table 1), more than one half reported a general
symptom (headache, fatigue, and loss of appetite most fre-
quently), and 3.3% reported hemorrhage. Thirty-three
(27%) contacts would have qualified as clinically suspect-
ed case-patients during the epidemic and should have been
taken to an isolation ward for assessment by an experi-
enced healthcare worker. This did not happen, and 23 of
these persons were not even known by authorities to be
contacts. 
On the basis of surveillance records and interviews with
family members, neighbors, or colleagues of the 113 eligi-
ble contacts we could not interview or obtain blood sam-
ples from, we identified 1 epidemiologically linked
patient, 1 suspected MHF case-patient, and 13 noncases;
for the 98 remaining contacts, information was insufficient
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76 (50 laboratory-confirmed, 26 epidemiologically
linked).
Secondary Attack Risk and Postintervention Rp
Thirty-one of 76 cases were identified as primary, 21 as
secondary, 15 as tertiary, and 5 as quaternary. Four cases
could not be classified. Eleven patients with secondary
cases acquired their infection as a household contact and
had only 1 patient with a fully investigated primary case as
a possible source. These constituted the numerator for the
secondary attack risk and contributed to the denominator.
Forty-two healthy contacts with only 1 patient with a fully
investigated primary case as possible source also con-
tributed to the denominator. The secondary attack risk was
thus estimated as 21% (11/[11 + 42], 95% CI 11–34) for
household contacts. Restricting the calculation to con-
firmed primary cases did not significantly change the sec-
ondary attack risk estimate. The average number of
household contacts per fully investigated primary case was
4.46, so that Rp for household contacts was estimated as
0.93. The tertiary attack risk (6/32 = 19%, CI 7–36) did not
differ from the secondary one.
Discussion
Most of the 121 household and community contacts of
MHF patients reported substantial unprotected exposure to
Marburg virus through physical contact with patients, their
body fluids, or remains. In addition to the secondary cases
identified through surveillance, we found serologic evi-
dence for Marburg infection in 2 persons and epidemiolog-
ic evidence in 1 person. For all 3 persons, substantial
clinical disease after the exposure was reported. As most
patients identified during the Watsa outbreak showed signs
of disease (D.G. Bausch et al., unpub. data), we conclude
that mild or asymptomatic Marburg infection, albeit possi-
ble (8), was a rare event.
One fourth of the seronegative contacts reported symp-
toms within 4 weeks of exposure, which fulfilled the defi-
nition for a suspected case. This figure illustrates the
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basis of clinical and epidemiologic data alone. The risk for
cross-contamination on the isolation ward, if persons are
incorrectly hospitalized, and the risk for continued com-
munity transmission, if true cases are not isolated, show
the necessity of having a laboratory diagnosis available
within 1 or 2 days.
Our secondary attack risk estimate of 21% is within the
range reported for Ebola outbreaks for comparable types of
contacts: Ebola-Zaire, Kikwit, 1995, household contacts
16% (5); Yambuku, 1976, close relatives, 20% (9); Ebola-
Sudan, Nzara, 1979, family members with physical contact
including nursing 31% (10) Our estimate is much higher
than the 2.5% reported for Ebola-Sudan, Uganda, 2000
(11); however, the Ugandan estimate may have included
persons who merely stayed in the same house as a patient
without reporting physical contact. The secondary and ter-
tiary attack risks in our study were found to be virtually
identical, 21% and 19%, respectively; thus no evidence
suggested that Marburg virus loses infectivity by repeated
passages through humans. 
We found the postintervention reproduction number Rp
to be <1; after the implementation of control measures,
secondary transmission was not sustainable in the commu-
nity. This finding is consistent with our observations dur-
ing the outbreak, whose prolonged duration of almost 16
months after control measures were initiated in May 1999
was due to repeated primary transmission into the human
population and not to sustained secondary transmission.
The outbreak ended when the dominant location of pri-
mary transmission, the Gorumbwa gold mine, ceased to be
accessible (D.G. Bausch et al., unpub. data). Our data do
not allow computing the preintervention basic reproduc-
tion number R0, so we cannot be certain how much of a dif-
ference the control measures made, but we think they had
some effect.
The proportion of contacts (71/212) and the number of
clinically suspected cases (33) missed by surveillance
were high. Two of 3 retrospectively identified MHF
patients were contacts of patients known to the health
authorities. These contacts reported symptoms that quali-
fied them as having suspected cases, but they were missed
nevertheless. Given the importance of early recognition
and isolation of MHF patients for outbreak control, this
finding raises the question of how the Watsa health author-
ities could have been better supported in their surveillance
activities. After Watsa’s chief medical officer died from
MHF in May 1999 (12), the post remained vacant for
many months. We suggest that continuous support to the
health zone by training and deploying a Congolese epi-
demiologist might have been more cost-effective than the
intermittent support provided by experts from May 1999 to
October 2000. This strategy would also have strengthened
DRC’s capacity to deal with future viral hemorrhagic fever
outbreaks.
The survey’s setting was characterized by high mobili-
ty because of the war and the flooding of the Gorumbwa
gold mine, and we could not investigate all cases fully
because of lack of available sources. For these reasons, we
located at best half of all contacts and probably fewer. We
could not make firm conclusions about those whom we
could not interview or obtain blood from: a few may have
contracted or even died from MHF. However, contacts for
whom no information was available were no more likely to
contract MHF than those we could study. In settings where
families are isolated from their surroundings, a filovirus
may wipe out a household, leaving no witness to report the
event. In Durba and Watsa, where households are physical-
ly and socially close, such a tragedy is unlikely to have
happened without anyone noticing, remembering, and
reporting; we therefore believe that a substantial survival
bias is unlikely.
The accuracy of reported exposure and symptoms may
have had recall bias, given the average interval of 2 years
between the patient’s disease and the survey. When our
data were compared with exposure information recorded
by surveillance officers during the outbreak, agreement
was satisfactory, however. Exposure patterns reflected tra-
ditional female and male roles in caring for diseased rela-
tives. Since no material gains were offered to newly
identified patients, we did not provide incentives to over-
report exposure or symptoms. Giving a blood sample is
unpopular in the study setting; to avoid underreporting
exposure and symptoms, study participants were informed
before the interview that a blood sample would be request-
ed, regardless of their answers to interview questions.
Those who did not wish to be interviewed or provide a
blood sample refused overtly. In summary, we believe the
interview data are valid.
If anti–Marburg IgG antibodies were transitory after
infection with Marburg virus, they might have fallen
below detectable levels in the interval between exposure
and blood collection. However, samples taken from 17
MHF survivors after 22 to 102 months of follow-up that
were stored, transported, and analyzed in the same way as
the samples of this survey showed that none became
seronegative. These persons from the 1994 or 1998–2000
MHF outbreaks became seropositive during or shortly
after disease and included 2 with mild Marburg disease
(M. Borchert, unpub. data). We conclude that Marburg
antibodies persisted sufficiently to be detected in our sero-
survey.
If some of our epidemiologically linked case-patients
did not have MHF, this result could have diluted the sec-
ondary attack risk. However, restricting the analysis to
confirmed cases did not increase, but rather reduced, the
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the secondary attack risks on the basis of confirmed and
epidemiologically linked cases, which is equally valid and
more stable because of the larger number of observations.
Calculation of secondary attack risk and Rp depends on
determining the transmission generations correctly. We are
confident that our data are of sufficient quality to allow
this, but an inherent uncertainty exists regarding patients
who worked as unofficial gold miners and reported sub-
stantial exposure to another patient. We think these persons
could be classified as having secondary cases, given the
confirmed secondary, but uncertain primary, exposure. In
the unlikely event that these were all primary cases, the
secondary attack risk would be reduced to 16%, which
would not change our conclusions substantially.
Conclusion
We found that asymptomatic or very mild Marburg
infection was a rare event in the Watsa outbreak. The
postintervention reproduction number Rp was <1, which
suggests that the MHF outbreak in Watsa and Durba was
sustained through repeated introduction of the virus into
the human population and not through secondary spread.
We showed that the identification and follow-up of con-
tacts during the outbreak were incomplete and raised the
question of how support for surveillance efforts in a health
zone such as Watsa could be improved.
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